Vietnam: Military and Paramilitary Forces — The People's Army, South China Sea Defense, and Defense Modernization

Introduction

Vietnam’s strategic geography has long defined its history, foreign policy, and national security posture. Sharing a land border with China, possessing a coastline stretching over 3,200 kilometers along the highly contested South China Sea (known in Vietnam as the East Sea), and sitting astride the world's most critical maritime trade routes, Vietnam is a country of immense geopolitical importance. Historically, its military has proven capable of defeating major world powers to secure national independence. Today, the country's defense architecture is shaped not only by this historical legacy but also by the economic resources generated through its rapid integration into the global economy. This article explores the structure of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the economics of Vietnamese defense spending, the country’s maritime defense strategy in the South China Sea, its ongoing defense modernization and diversification efforts, and the unique economic role played by military-owned conglomerates.

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN): Party Control and Structure

The military of Vietnam is not a neutral state institution; it is the armed wing of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Under the country's Vietnam: Government Structure, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is constitutionally sworn to protect the socialist state, the party leadership, and the citizens of Vietnam.

The ultimate authority over the military lies with the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest party organ for military policy. The CMC is chaired directly by the General Secretary of the CPV, emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party over the armed forces. To ensure ideological alignment and political loyalty, PAVN utilizes a dual-command structure. Every military unit has both a military commander and a political officer (commissar) from the General Political Department. The political commissar is responsible for political education, party building, and ensuring that all military operations conform to CPV directives.

The PAVN comprises approximately 482,000 active-duty personnel, backed by a massive reserve force of over 5 million. It is organized into several distinct branches:

1. Ground Forces (Lục quân): Historically the core of the military, structured into four major corps and nine regional military zones.
2. Navy (Hải quân Nhân dân Việt Nam): Tasked with defending Vietnam's extensive coastline, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and island claims.
3. Air and Air Defense Force (Phòng không - Không quân): Responsible for airspace protection and maritime air patrol.
4. Border Guard (Bộ đội Biên phòng): Tasked with managing security along Vietnam's rugged land borders with China, Laos, and Cambodia.
5. Coast Guard (Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam): A paramilitary force under the Ministry of National Defense responsible for maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and sovereignty protection.

Defense Economics: Budgets and Transparency

Analyzing the financial dimensions of Vietnam's military is exceptionally challenging due to strict state secrecy. In Vietnam, national defense budgets, military procurement contracts, and strategic asset acquisitions are classified as state secrets. Under the State Bank of Vietnam's financing framework and the Ministry of Finance's fiscal oversight, only highly aggregated, non-itemized defense figures are occasionally published or shared with international bodies.

However, independent security think tanks, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), estimate that Vietnam’s annual defense expenditure has risen in tandem with its rapid economic growth. In recent years, Vietnam's defense budget is estimated to be between 2.2% and 2.5% of its gross domestic product (GDP), amounting to roughly $7 billion to $8 billion annually.

While this level of spending is modest compared to giant neighbors like China, it represents a dramatic increase from the post-reunification financial history of Vietnam and the impoverished economic transformation under Doi Moi. The surge in export-led manufacturing, fueled by the China Plus One logistics boom and high-tech semiconductor ambitions, has provided the Vietnamese state with the fiscal capacity to finance extensive procurement programs without jeopardizing its macroeconomic stability or social spending commitments.

The South China Sea (East Sea) Defense Strategy

The primary focus of Vietnam's modern defense planning is the South China Sea (East Sea) dispute. Vietnam claims sovereignty over both the Paracel Islands (occupied by China since 1974) and the Spratly Islands, where it occupies approximately 21 islands, reefs, and outposts. These maritime territories are vital not only for national pride and security but also because they contain rich fishing grounds, strategic shipping lanes, and vast untapped oil and natural gas reserves.

To counter China’s massive military superiority, Vietnam has adopted a highly sophisticated Asymmetric Warfare and Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy. The objective is not to defeat a major adversary in a head-on fleet battle, but to make any military intervention in Vietnam’s waters prohibitively costly and risky.

The pillars of Vietnam's A2/AD strategy include:

• Submarine Deterrence: In the mid-2000s, Vietnam made its most significant defense acquisition by purchasing six advanced, stealthy Project 636.3 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia. These submarines, based at Cam Ranh Bay, are equipped with land-attack and anti-ship Klub cruise missiles, giving the Vietnamese Navy a highly potent, silent deterrent capable of striking enemy surface fleets and naval bases.
• Coastal Defense Missiles: Vietnam has deployed highly advanced Russian-made K-300P Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missile systems. Armed with supersonic Yakhont anti-ship missiles, these systems can target enemy ships up to 300 kilometers away, covering almost the entirety of Vietnam’s territorial waters.
• Maritime Fortifications: Vietnam has engaged in extensive land reclamation and fortification of its occupied outposts in the Spratly Islands. It has built airstrips, harbors, radar stations, and artillery emplacements, improving its early-warning capabilities and its ability to project power defensively.

Defense Modernization and the Russian Dilemma

Historically, Vietnam’s military hardware has been overwhelmingly Soviet and Russian in origin. Between 1995 and 2020, Russia supplied over 80% of Vietnam's major arms imports, including Su-30MK2 fighter jets, Gepard-class frigates, Kilo-class submarines, and S-300 air defense systems. This dependence was built on deep historical ties, highly competitive pricing, and Moscow's willingness to sell advanced offensive weapons without placing human rights conditions on the sales.

However, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 has plunged Vietnam’s defense procurement strategy into a severe crisis, forcing an urgent reevaluation:

1. Supply Chain Disruptions: Russian defense manufacturers are struggling to supply spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance services to export customers as their entire industrial capacity is consumed by the war effort.
2. Sanctions Risks: Under the US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), countries purchasing major military equipment from Russia face severe financial sanctions, potentially jeopardizing Vietnam’s critical trade relations with the West.
3. Technological Limitations: The performance of some Russian military hardware in Ukraine has raised questions about its effectiveness against modern, Western-trained adversaries, encouraging Hanoi to seek more advanced technology elsewhere.

In response, Vietnam is actively pursuing a strategy of defense diversification and indigenization. It has hosted major international defense expos to attract suppliers from around the world. The military is increasingly procuring equipment from non-traditional partners:

• Israel: Vietnam has purchased Spyder air-defense missile systems and Galil assault rifle manufacturing licenses.
• India: New Delhi has provided patrol boats, modernized Vietnamese naval ships, and offered line-of-credit financing for defense procurement.
• South Korea: Vietnam has expressed strong interest in South Korean T-50 trainer aircraft, K9 self-propelled howitzers, and naval vessels.
• The United States: Since the lifting of the US arms embargo in 2016, Washington has transferred several former US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters to the Vietnamese Coast Guard, boosting its maritime law enforcement capabilities.

The Economic Role of the Military: Viettel and Saigon Newport

A unique and controversial feature of Vietnam’s defense economics is the extensive commercial business empire owned and operated by the military itself. Unlike in Western countries where the armed forces are purely consumers of public tax revenues, the PAVN operates dozens of state-owned commercial enterprises, which generate billions of dollars in revenue and subsidize the military budget.

The most famous and successful military-owned enterprise is the Viettel Military Industry and Telecom Group. Owned directly by the Ministry of National Defense, Viettel is the largest telecommunications provider in Vietnam and one of the country's most valuable state-owned brands. Viettel operates not only domestically but also has major telecom operations in ten countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Beyond telecommunications, Viettel acts as the lead developer for Vietnam’s indigenous high-tech defense industry, designing and manufacturing military-grade drones, radar systems, software-defined radios, and cybersecurity systems.

Another massive military enterprise is Saigon Newport Corporation (Tổng công ty Tân Cảng Sài Gòn). Owned by the Vietnamese Navy, Saigon Newport is the country’s premier seaport operator, managing over 50% of Vietnam’s total container import-export volume and running critical deepwater terminals in both Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong.

While these military-owned businesses provide the PAVN with significant self-financing capability and support national industrial development, they also present economic drawbacks. These military giants enjoy preferential access to state resources, land, and capital, occasionally crowding out private sector competitors and complicating efforts to reform and "equitize" the state-owned enterprise sector.

Paramilitary Forces: The Militia and Self-Defense Forces

In addition to its active-duty forces, Vietnam relies heavily on its Militia and Self-Defense Forces (Dân quân Tự vệ - DQTV), a massive, low-cost paramilitary organization numbering over 1 million members. The DQTV is a mass organization composed of citizens who maintain their regular civilian jobs but receive basic military training and are mobilized for local security, disaster relief, and civil defense.

The DQTV is divided into two main branches:

• Militia (Dân quân): Organized in rural communes and villages, responsible for local security, border patrols, and supporting regular army units.
• Self-Defense (Tự vệ): Organized within state offices, schools, and state-owned commercial enterprises (including industrial parks), responsible for protecting infrastructure and maintaining order during crises.

In the South China Sea, Vietnam has established a highly specialized Maritime Militia (Dân quân tự vệ biển). Composed of commercial fishermen whose boats are equipped with state-subsidized communications and surveillance gear, the Maritime Militia operates on the front lines of the maritime dispute. They monitor foreign vessel movements, report illegal incursions to the Coast Guard, and act as a grey-zone deterrent, allowing Vietnam to assert its sovereignty claims without deploying active-duty naval warships that could escalate tensions.

Geopolitical Alignment and the "Four No's" Policy

As Vietnam modernizes its military and navigates growing geopolitical tensions, its strategic alignment is governed by a strict, defensive foreign policy framework known as the "Four No's", which was formally articulated in the 2019 National Defense White Paper:

1. No military alliances: Vietnam will not join any formal military treaty or collective defense organization.
2. No foreign military bases: Vietnam will not permit foreign powers to establish military bases or use its territory for military activities.
3. No joining one country to fight another: Vietnam will not ally with any country against a third party.
4. No force or threat of force: Vietnam is committed to resolving all international disputes, including maritime claims, through peaceful diplomatic negotiations.

This "Four No's" policy is a cornerstone of Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy." It reassures Beijing that Vietnam will not enter into a formal military alliance with the United States or host US naval fleets at the strategic Cam Ranh Bay. At the same time, it preserves Vietnam’s strategic independence, allowing it to build "Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships" and deep security relationships with the US, India, Japan, and Australia, while simultaneously maintaining deep trade ties with China.

Conclusion

The military and paramilitary forces of Vietnam represent a highly capable, ideologically loyal defense architecture designed to safeguard national sovereignty in an increasingly volatile region. Financed by the fruits of its modern export-led economic success, the People’s Army of Vietnam is transforming itself from a legacy, ground-centric force into a modern, high-tech military capable of projecting asymmetric denial capabilities into the South China Sea.

As Vietnam navigates the complex challenges of the late 2020s—including the disruption of its traditional Russian military supply chains and the growing naval power of its neighbors—it must continue to balance its defense spending with fiscal prudence. By maintaining its flexible "bamboo diplomacy," diversifying its international procurement, and leveraging its unique military-owned business conglomerates, Vietnam aims to preserve the peace and stability that have made its modern economic miracle possible.

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