This article provides a comprehensive overview of the governance and administrative architecture of South Sudan under the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement. It analyzes the power-sharing transitional executive, the state boundary disputes, and the mandate of the Bank of South Sudan. Additionally, it highlights the ongoing public financial management reforms and fiscal challenges.
Educational content only — not personalized financial, legal, or tax advice.
The institutional architecture of South Sudan, the world’s youngest sovereign state, is characterized by a complex and often fragile governance framework. Since gaining independence in 2011, the country’s state-building process has been severely disrupted by political rivalries, institutional weakness, and economic crises. The governance of South Sudan is currently defined by transitional arrangements, specifically the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
At the center of this governance structure is the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), which operates under a delicate power-sharing formula. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of South Sudan’s government structure, examining the Transitional Constitution of 2011, the power-sharing executive, the complex administrative divisions, and the critical role of the Bank of South Sudan (BoSS) in managing the long-term economic future of the state.
Following its historic secession from Sudan, South Sudan adopted the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011. This document established a unitary republic with a presidential system of government, concentrating significant authority within the executive branch. The constitution was intended to guide the nation through an initial transitional period while a permanent constitution-drafting process was undertaken.
Under the 2011 Transitional Constitution, the President serves as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander-in-Chief of South Sudan’s SSPDF.
The document granted the executive sweeping powers, including the authority to appoint and dismiss governors, dissolve the national legislature, and declare states of emergency with limited legislative oversight. While the constitution established a nominal separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice, the judiciary and legislature have consistently struggled to assert their independence, leading to a highly centralized governance model.
This high centralization of power was a direct continuation of the command structures developed by the SPLM during the decades of liberation struggle. In wartime, military command and political authority were concentrated in a single leadership council. When the transitional constitution was drafted, these command habits were codified, granting the president absolute power over the administrative units.
For instance, Article 101 of the constitution allows the president to remove elected state governors if they are deemed a threat to national security, a provision that has been utilized repeatedly to remove political opponents and replace them with loyal military commanders. This constitutional design has undermined the principles of federalism and local autonomy, creating deep resentment in the states.
The outbreak of civil war in December 2013 exposed the deep structural flaws and political exclusions of the initial governance system. After years of mediation led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the warring factions signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018.
The R-ARCSS serves as the supreme governance framework for the country's ongoing transitional phase, superseding conflicting provisions of the 2011 Transitional Constitution. The agreement outlines a comprehensive roadmap for state reconstruction, focusing on security sector reform, constitutional development, humanitarian assistance, and transitional justice.
Crucially, Chapter IV of the R-ARCSS mandates extensive reforms in resource, economic, and financial management, aiming to address the systemic corruption and fiscal mismanagement that led to oil shutdowns and hyperinflation during the height of the conflict.
The implementation of the R-ARCSS has been hindered by a lack of political trust and constant disagreements over the scheduling of key milestones. The permanent constitution-making process, which is supposed to lay the legal foundation for the country's first democratic elections, has faced chronic delays.
Without a permanent constitution that clearly defines the division of power, the country remains stuck in an endless cycle of transitional extensions. Furthermore, the establishment of transitional justice institutions, such as the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing, has been blocked by senior political leaders who fear prosecution for their actions during the civil war.
The executive branch of South Sudan is currently organized under the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), which was formally established in February 2020. The R-TGoNU features a unique and highly complex power-sharing executive designed to accommodate the country's rival political-military factions.
At the apex of the executive is President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who represents the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-IG). Under the power-sharing formula, Dr. Riek Machar Teny serves as the First Vice President, representing the SPLM-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO).
The executive also includes four additional Vice Presidents, each representing different political coalitions, including the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) and Former Detainees (FDs).
This multi-tiered executive structure was designed to prevent a return to war by ensuring all major armed groups have a stake in the central administration. However, this power-sharing model has also led to gridlock, as decision-making is often paralyzed by mutual distrust and slow implementation of the peace agreement.
The legislative branch has also been heavily modified to reflect this power-sharing arrangement. The Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) was expanded from 400 to 550 members, and the Council of States was reorganized to include representatives from all major signatory parties.
This expansion has made the legislative process highly bureaucratic and expensive. The state budget is heavily burdened by the operational costs of maintaining a massive legislature and five separate vice-presidential offices, leaving minimal resources for public investment or development. Decisions are rarely made through democratic debate; instead, they are negotiated behind closed doors by the leaders of the main political factions, rendering the parliament largely symbolic.
The internal administrative geography of South Sudan has been a continuous source of political and military contention. At independence, the country was divided into 10 states, reflecting the colonial-era boundaries of the three historical provinces: Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile.
In 2015, in a move to solidify political support and alter demographic balances, President Kiir unilaterally expanded the number of states to 28, and later to 32. This expansion created intense friction, as it redrew internal administrative boundaries and exacerbated ethnic disputes over land ownership and resource allocation.
As part of the compromise that enabled the formation of the R-TGoNU in 2020, the government agreed to revert to the original 10 states.
Additionally, the current structure includes three special administrative areas: Abyei, Greater Pibor, and Ruweng. These administrative areas are governed through direct arrangements with the central presidency, reflecting their unique security and economic importance, particularly Ruweng's concentration of oil infrastructure and Abyei's disputed status with Khartoum.
The creation of the 28 and 32 states broke down traditional ethnic cohabitation, as administrative lines were frequently drawn to favor certain groups over others, particularly regarding access to oil wells and water sources. Reverting to the 10 states in 2020 was a crucial step toward de-escalating national political tensions, but it did not resolve the localized boundary disputes that had been triggered by the expansion.
Today, local county boundaries remain highly contested, leading to frequent outbreaks of violence in Upper Nile and Jonglei. The administrative vacuum has also allowed local militias to assume governance roles, collecting informal taxes and enforcing security outside the formal control of the state.
The Bank of South Sudan (BoSS) is the central bank of the Republic of South Sudan, established in 2011 pursuant to the Bank of South Sudan Act. The BoSS is legally mandated to formulate and implement monetary policy, manage foreign exchange reserves, issue the national currency (the South Sudanese Pound), and supervise the financial sector.
The Governor of the BoSS, appointed by the President, serves as the chief executive officer of the institution.
The central bank's operational history has been deeply intertwined with the country's fiscal crises. During the civil war, the BoSS was frequently forced to monetize the government's fiscal deficit, leading to unchecked money printing and subsequent hyperinflation.
Under the current transitional framework and IMF Staff Monitored Programs, the BoSS has embarked on critical reforms to restore monetary discipline. These include unifying the official and parallel exchange rates, implementing a Treasury Single Account, and strengthening regulatory oversight over commercial banks and foreign exchange bureaus to improve transparency and attract foreign investment to develop the South Sudan: Economic Future.
One of the most persistent monetary challenges is the high level of dollarization and the size of the shadow economy. Because the domestic currency has historically suffered from high depreciation, most commercial transactions are conducted in US dollars, Kenyan shillings, or Ugandan shillings.
Furthermore, up to 80% of cash in circulation is estimated to exist outside the formal banking system, held by informal traders and military elites in private safes. This severe lack of financial intermediation prevents the BoSS from using traditional monetary tools, such as interest rate adjustments, to control inflation or stimulate credit growth, highlighting the urgent need for structural financial reforms.
South Sudan's fiscal policy is characterized by extreme vulnerability and a lack of transparency. The Ministry of Finance and Planning is responsible for drafting the national budget, but the formal budgetary process has frequently collapsed due to the country’s near-total dependency on oil revenues.
When South Sudan: A Financial History cut off South Sudan from traditional northern financial markets, the state struggled to collect domestic taxes.
To bridge fiscal deficits, the Ministry of Finance and the BoSS engaged in highly opaque oil pre-sales. Under these arrangements, international oil traders provided short-term advances to the government, secured against future oil deliveries.
This mechanism bypassed parliamentary oversight and created a parallel financial system that favored military elites and foreign creditors. The legacy of these pre-sales continues to burden the national budget, as a significant portion of current oil production must be delivered to international traders to service outstanding debts, leaving minimal revenue for public services.
The fiscal collapse was exacerbated by leakages in non-oil revenue collections. Although the National Revenue Authority (NRA) was established to collect customs duties and domestic taxes, its operations have been undermined by institutional resistance from various ministries that historically collected these revenues off-budget.
Customs checkpoints along the border with Uganda and Kenya have frequently been controlled by local military commanders, who divert collections directly to their units. This fragmentation of revenue collection prevents the state from compiling an accurate account of its finances, severely compromising its ability to deliver basic public services.
To rebuild international credibility and stabilize its economy, the R-TGoNU has committed to implementing a series of Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms under the guidance of international financial institutions.
The PFM Reform Committee, established in 2020, has focused on enhancing budget transparency, establishing a unified salary payment system for civil servants, and operationalizing the National Revenue Authority (NRA) to boost non-oil tax collection.
Additionally, the R-ARCSS mandates the restructuring of key anti-corruption bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission and the National Audit Chamber.
However, these institutions remain chronically underfunded and lack the enforcement powers necessary to prosecute high-level corruption. The successful professionalization of these financial institutions is vital to dismantle the war economy and ensure that public resources are used to rebuild the country's shattered social infrastructure and resolve tribal militias and integration challenges.
The PFM reforms represent a major ideological shift, moving away from a system of militarized patronage to a rules-based public treasury. However, the political elite has shown significant resistance to these changes, as transparency directly threatens their control over the country's wealth.
For reforms to succeed, they must be accompanied by a strengthening of the judiciary, enabling the prosecution of financial crimes. Without accountability, the establishment of new regulatory frameworks will do little to alter the underlying dynamics of the political economy, leaving the state in a condition of perpetual vulnerability.
The government structure of South Sudan remains a work in progress, characterized by transitional power-sharing institutions and a continuous struggle to establish rule of law. The R-TGoNU represents a pragmatic, yet fragile, compromise designed to maintain a delicate peace between rival military-political factions.
For South Sudan to transition from a state of perpetual transition to a stable democracy, it must successfully implement the permanent constitution-drafting process, professionalize its central banking and public financial management systems, and devolve genuine authority to its states and administrative areas. Only by building strong, accountable, and transparent public institutions can the world's newest nation overcome the legacy of conflict and achieve sustainable development.